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ABSTRACT 
 
The article seeks to advance the policy debate about court governance by reference to 
recent developments in Australia and other countries. It is argued that a corporate-style 
management board should be responsible for the judicial and administrative operations 
of the courts, with administrative judges and the CEO acting on the board as executive 
directors. It is contended that such an arrangement would be capable of achieving greater 
structural separation between ‘ownership’ and ‘management’ in the courts, which is 
regarded as an essential postulate of modern corporate law, because it promotes more 
expert and efficient management of large organisations. The paper also seeks to resolve 
the inherent conceptual difficulties involved in applying the corporate law theory to the 
courts, by arguing that the so-called ‘stewardship’ theory of corporate governance is 
capable of reconciling the key principles of modern corporate board design with the 
unique institutional character of the judicial organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Good corporate governance lies at the heart of all successful 
organisations. In the private sector, it has long been recognised that 
effective corporate governance can positively influence the way in which 
companies seek to achieve their objectives, monitor risk and optimise 
performance.1 Over the last 20 years, successive governments in 
Australia and other countries have recognised the benefits of good 
corporate governance by actively promoting and implementing best-
practice governance standards in government-owned corporations and 
areas of the public service.2  
 In contrast, the corporate transformation of the third arm of 
government – the courts - has been much slower and more sporadic, 
particularly outside the USA, due to a range of constitutional, cultural, 
organisational and procedural impediment.3 It is also well-documented 
in the literature that judges are resistant to organisational change and 
that they often take a sceptical view of the management solutions that 
have been developed in the commercial world. As recently as 2006, the 
Chief Justice of New South Wales (NSW) forcefully argued that 
management evaluation frameworks for the courts belonged to the 
‘autistic school of management.’4 
 Nevertheless, in the last 10 years, a consensus developed, both in 
Australia and internationally, that the traditional management 
arrangements in the courts have had a negative impact on the strategic 
long-term planning of court operations and overall performance. A 
landmark comparative study of the civil litigation systems of NSW and 
Germany revealed that the German courts were ‘light years ahead’5 in 
terms of work organisation, procedure, litigation costs, timeliness, 
access to justice and client satisfaction.6 An influential management 
study commissioned by the Australasian Institute for Judicial 
Administration found that a vast majority of the Australian state courts 
operated an ineffective organisational framework that was considered 
                                                 
1 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, Asx Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX, 3rd ed, 2014), 3. 
2 See for example, the Victorian Public Sector Commission’s Board guidelines, at 
<http://vpsc.vic.gov.au/html-resources/welcome-to-the-board/> (viewed 25 
February 2016); see generally also John Uhrig, 'Review of the  Corporate Governance 
of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). 
3 See generally Graham Gee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the Uk's 
Changing Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Ch 10.  
4 Spiegelman J, 'Measuring Court Performance Address' (Paper presented at the 24th 
AIJA Conference, Adelaide, South Australia, 15-17 September 2006). 
5 Richard Ackland, 'We Should Look to Germany for Justice', The Age (Melbourne), 1 
October 2010 <http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/we-should-look-to-germany-for-
justice-20100930-15zcz.html>. < http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/we-should-look-
to-germany-for-justice-20100930-15zcz.html> (viewed 25 February 2016). 
6A. Marfording and A. Eyland, 'Civil Litigation in New South Wales: Empirical and 
Analytical Comparisons with Germany' (UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2010-28, 15 
July 2010). 
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to be outdated in the management literature.7 In particular, the study 
found that there were two separate and disjointed management systems 
operating inside the courts, whereby judges were responsible for the 
dispensation of justice, while court administrators were separately 
responsible for the courts’ operational management, on behalf of the 
Department of Justice. The main problem with this arrangement was 
that the judges had assumed the responsibility for improving court 
performance, while having insufficient authority over court operations.8 
 Around the same time, two international studies in the EU and 
Canada pointed to the possibility that the problems of organisational 
misalignment would likely persist even where the responsibility for 
court administration is transferred from the executive government to an 
independent courts administration authority.9 One of the reasons for 
this finding was that judges were not sufficiently involved in the 
strategic planning of court operations due to ongoing reliance on the 
central authority that replaced the executive government.10 To address 
this issue, the EU study suggested that an integrated management board 
inside each individual court might be better-placed to coordinate the 
judicial and administrative operations and transform the courts from 
‘organisations of professionals’ into ‘professional organisations.’11  
 The Victorian County and Supreme Courts have recently established 
non-statutory internal management boards in each court with 
responsibility for court administration, although no information is 
publicly available about their structure, powers and functions. This 
paper seeks to advance the policy debate in this area by identifying a 
number of principles of good corporate governance that would be useful 
in considering the structure and powers of court management boards. 
The principal focus will be on the courts in Victoria, although the 
administrative principles would equally apply to other jurisdictions 
where the statutory responsibility for court administration is formally 
vested in large collegiate boards of judges or divided between the 
judiciary and a centralised courts administration authority.  
 It is argued that a single management board should be responsible 
for all of the judicial and administrative operations in each court, with 
judges and the court CEO acting on the board as executive directors. It 
is contended that such an arrangement would be capable of 
safeguarding the unique institutional character of the courts, while also 
achieving greater structural separation between ‘ownership’ and 
‘management’, which is regarded as an essential postulate of modern 
corporate law, because it promotes more efficient and expert 
                                                 
7 J. Alford et al, The Governance of Australia's Courts: A Managerial Perspective 
(Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2004) .   
8 Ibid 86. 
9 Carl Baar et al, Alternative Models of Court Administration (Ottawa: Canadian 
Judicial Council, 2006), 102-3; Wim Voermans and Pim Albers, 'Councils for the 
Judiciary in Eu Countries' (CEPEJ, 2003) 37.  
10 Baar et al, above n  9: 102-3; Voermans and Albers, above n 9, 112. 
11 Voermans and Albers, above n 9: 101, referring to Voermans et al., Wim Voermans 
and Pim Albers, 'Geintegreerde Rechtbanken: Het Vervolg, Evaluatierapport 
Herziening Rechtlijke Organisatie (Onderdeel II)' (1994), 90-1. 
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management of large organisations.12 A posteriori, this paper seeks to 
resolve the inherent conceptual difficulties involved in applying the 
corporate law theory to the courts, by arguing that the so-called 
‘stewardship’ theory of corporate governance is capable of reconciling 
the key principles of corporate board design with the unique 
institutional character of the judicial organisation.  
The first part of this article provides an overview of the court 
governance systems in Australia and the problems associated with the 
existing frameworks of court administration. Part 2 identifies the 
principles underpinning the corporate transformation of the judiciaries 
in the USA, UK and the Netherlands, where the court administration 
frameworks are transparent and much more clearly defined. Part 3 
seeks to reconcile the theory of modern corporate board design with the 
unique characteristics of court governance. It proposes a small board of 
executive judges that would functionally integrate the management and 
policy-making functions in a single administrative court authority, 
while also ensuring more effective collegiate decision-making on behalf 
of the court as a whole. The final Part seeks to anchor the proposed 
theoretical model in practice, by highlighting the emerging contours of 
the executive board model in the courts of the USA, Australia and the 
Netherlands. 
I.OVERVIEW OF THE COURT GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN AUSTRALIA 
 Even a cursory look at the landscape of the Australian court system 
must distinguish between the federal and state courts, because there are 
vastly different governance arrangements in place between the courts 
and the executive government, and also among the courts themselves. 
In a majority of the states, the court operations, budgeting, 
administrative policy and infrastructure are managed by the executive 
government, while judges principally remain in charge of the judicial 
aspects of court administration, which include judicial management, 
case management, adjudication and procedure.13  In some states, such 
as Queensland, the statutory authority over the judicial administrative 
arrangements is vested in the Chief Judges alone, while in others, such 
as Victoria, all judges exercise their administrative powers collectively 
through the so-called councils of judges.  
 In contrast, the Australian federal courts were granted full 
administrative independence from the executive government in the late 
1970s and 1980s, because the federal government considered that there 
was ‘little systemic incentive to efficiency’ in the executive model and 
                                                 
12 Elizabeth J. Boros and John Duns, Corporate Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
ed, 2013) 90; Klaus Hopt and Patrick Leyens, 'Board Models in Europe – Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France and Italy' (2004) 1(2) European Company & Financial Law Review 
135, 136. The authors note that since the establishment of the Dutch East India 
Company in 1602, the corporate law has tried to solve the problem of the separation 
of ownership and control; See also Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1. 
13 Supreme Court of Victoria, Courts' Strategic Directions Project (State of Victoria, 
2004) 71. 
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also because of the concerns about its impact on judicial independence. 
14 As a result, the full administrative authority over court operations in 
the High Court of Australia was vested in a collegiate board comprising 
all seven justices of that court, while the administration of the much 
larger federal courts was vested in the Chief Justices of those courts 
alone.15 
 In 2014, the government of Victoria decided to transfer its 
operational control over court administration to an independent 
statutory entity called Court Services Victoria (CSV), which was 
modelled on the South Australian Judicial Council.16 The main function 
of CSV is to provide the shared administrative services and operational 
facilities to the courts under a judicial umbrella, but without 
substantially affecting the existing internal governance arrangements in 
the courts themselves.17  
 The brief outline of the existing models of court administration in 
Australia indicates that there are two basic systems of organisation of 
work in the courts. The first is a vertical system of governance, where 
the responsibility for both policy-making and administration is formally 
vested in the Chief Judges. This is the model that operates in the federal 
courts and, on the judicial side alone, in Queensland.18 In contrast, a 
horizontal, collegiate approach to court governance is found in the High 
Court of Australia and most state jurisdictions, including Victoria.  
A.Advantages and disadvantages of the federal courts vertical model 
 According to Church and Sallmann, the key advantage of vesting the 
sole operational authority in the Chief Justices in the federal courts is 
that administrative accountability and authority are vested in specific 
individuals, which means that responses to problems can be ‘swift and 
consistent.’19 This framework places clear lines of administrative 
accountability and responsibility in the Chief Justices, which is 
particularly important in the federal courts, because the Chief Justices 
                                                 
14 Stephen Skehill, 'Comment on Court Governance' (1994) 4 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 29 
15 See generally Peter Sallmann and Tim Smith, 'Constitutionalism and Managerial 
Effectiveness: Revisiting Australian Courts' Governance' in Australian Courts : 
Serving Democracy and Its Publics (Australasian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 2013) 265. 
16 Court Services Victoria Act 2014 (Vic). Notably, the South Australian Judicial 
Council itself was modelled on the Judicial Conference of the USA. 
17 At the time of the writing, the Victorian County Court and the Supreme Court were 
considering the introduction of non-statutory court management boards, but these 
arrangements are subject to the existing statutory authority of the Councils of Judges. 
No public information is presently available about the proposed initiative. 
18 Under s. 15 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the Chief Justice is 
responsible for ensuring the orderly and expeditious discharge of the business of the 
court. By s. 18A of the Act, the Chief Justice is also responsible for managing the 
administrative affairs of the court. In Queensland, the executive government 
continues to manage the administrative side of court operations, but the Chief Justice 
is in charge of the judicial administrative policy. 
19 Thomas  Church and Peter Sallmann, Governing Australia's Courts (Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration, 1991) 68.   
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are also responsible for the financial and operational affairs of the 
courts.20  
 Notably, the Chief Justices’ formal statutory powers have been 
further expanded in recent years to also include full responsibility for 
the administration of the intra-curial arrangements in the distribution 
and execution of the judicial business of those courts.21 This point is best 
illustrated by section 15 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, 
which gives the Chief Justice the responsibility to ensure the ‘effective, 
orderly and expeditious’ discharge of the business of the court, together 
with the corresponding powers to assign cases and caseloads to 
particular judges, and even to temporarily restrict judges to non-sitting 
duties. The Chief Justices are assisted in the exercise of their duties by 
the court CEOs, who are responsible for implementing high-level policy 
and may also act on behalf of the Chief Justice in the administrative 
affairs of the Courts.22 
Critics of the federal court system of governance point to the fact 
that the sole organisational responsibility for both policy-making and 
management of the courts is formally vested in the one individual. 
According to Church and Sallmann, that arrangement has the potential 
to ‘retard’ the development of administrative capacity and involvement 
of other judicial officers of the court.23 Furthermore, the assignment of 
the sole policy-making responsibility to the Chief Justices has been 
criticised from a traditional management perspective on the basis that 
it does not sufficiently separate ‘management’ from ‘policy making’ of 
the institution and therefore does not comply with modern corporate 
governance practices.24 Alford et al illustrate this problem by discussing 
a hypothetical example of an incompetent, inefficient or even 
‘tyrannical’ Chief Justice who is able to dominate the court’s affairs in a 
manner contrary to the ideal of judicial independence.25 
                                                 
20 See Michael Black, 'The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30 Years—a Survey on 
the Occasion of Two Anniversaries' (2007) 31(3) Melbourne University Law Review 
1017, Ch XII.  See Peter Sallmann and Richard T Wright, Going to Court: A 
Discussion Paper on Civil Justice in Victoria (Victoria. Department of Justice, 2000) 
10.  Federal judges stress that ‘“self-administration” is the golden key’ to operational 
effectiveness and accountability. 
21 Section 15 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth). 
22 See, for example, s 38D of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).  
23 Church and Sallmann, above n 19, 68. See also Justice RE McGarvie, 'The 
Foundations of Judicial Independence in a Modern Democracy' (1991) 1 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 24. Justice McGarvie highlights the risk of the development 
of an informal “kitchen cabinet.” See also Edward C Gallas, Nesta M Gallas and 
Ernest Friesen Jr, Managing the Courts (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1971) 140. 
24 Ibid. See also Lou Hill, Constitutional and Managerial Principles of Judicial Court 
Governance: Implementation in the State of Victoria (LLM Thesis, The University of 
Melbourne, 1995) 82-83.  
25 See Alford et al,  above n 7, 74.  Reference is also made to Sir Garfield Barwick CJ’s 
dominant role in the High Court of Australia, which led to the changes to the High 
Court’s internal governance model. See Neil Andrews, 'Vinegar Free-Sir Garfield 
Barwick's Recipe for Judicial Salad' (1996) 3 Canberra L. Rev. 175, 189.  
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B.The collegiate governance model in Victoria 
 The Chief Justices’ administrative supremacy in the federal courts 
stands in sharp contrast to the traditional collegiate model of judicial 
court governance in Victoria, which is embodied in the statutory 
councils of judges in each of the court tiers.26 The administrative 
authority of the councils was entrenched in the original legislation that 
established the Supreme Court in the 19th century, when only a handful 
of judges were appointed to the bench.27 According to the Victorian 
Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, the original legislation had contemplated 
a Council of only four judges to be responsible for administering the 
Court in 1852. She contrasts this with the more recent situation, when 
there were almost 40 judicial officers on the Council of Judges in the 
Supreme Court alone.28 The Chief Justice’s comments suggest that the 
existing judicial administrative arrangements have become unwieldy, 
because, ‘as courts and tribunals become larger, the traditional 
structures of internal management and leadership become more 
cumbersome and provide a poor fit.’29 
 One of the criticisms of the ‘all justices’ collegiate model is that it 
furthers administrative ambiguity. The European Council for the 
Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) points out that large collegiate assemblies 
of judges tend to promote weak and inefficient policy-making, because 
they are primarily aimed at reaching a consensus on all aspects of the 
judges’ work in the courts.30 This issue had been noted much earlier in 
the USA, where the Hruska Commission in 1973 examined the collegiate 
governance structures in the courts of California and concluded that any 
court governing organ with more than 15 members ‘inevitably gives rise 
to serious problems of administration and of internal operation.’31  
 In Victoria, this problem is further compounded by the fact that, 
apart from the generic provisions in the courts legislation that establish 
the councils of judges,32 there are few other provisions in the legislation 
itself that clarify the relationship between the judiciary and the 
administrative structures in the courts.33 Unlike the Australian federal 
                                                 
26 See s.28 of the Supreme Court Act 1986; s. 87 of the County Court Act 1958; s. 15 of 
the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989. 
27 Civil Justice Committee, 'Report to the Honourable Attorney-General Concerning 
the Administration of Justice in Victoria' (1984) 341. The Committee also noted that 
the court staff had at first not been under the control of the executive government, 
even though some of them had been paid out of public funds. 
28 Marylin Warren, 'State of the Victorian Judicature' (Paper presented at Banco 
Court, Supreme Court of Victoria, 22 May 2007) 36. 
29Ibid 35.  
30Voermans and Albers, 'Councils for the Judiciary in Eu Countries,' above n 9, 100-1. 
31 Thomas Church Jr, 'Administration of an Appellate Leviathan:  Court Management 
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' in Arthur D Hellman (ed), The Innovations of 
the Ninth Circuit and the Future of the Federal Courts (Cornell University Press, 
1990) 226, 229. 
32 See s 15 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic); s 87 County Court Act 1958 (Vic); s 28 
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). 
33 There are notable exceptions. For example, sections 6 and 13 of the Magistrates’ 
Court Act 1989 confer on the Chief Magistrate the powers to assign duties to 
magistrates and to ensure their attendances in court.  Similarly, there are provisions 
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courts legislation, which confers specific administrative powers on the 
Chief Justices and the CEOs, the Victorian legislation is practically 
silent on this issue. That does not mean that the Victorian courts have 
not developed any administrative arrangements. As former Supreme 
Court Justice Richard McGarvie pointed out more than 20 years ago, 
the courts have developed relatively sophisticated non-statutory 
internal administrative divisions, which were assigned to specific 
judges-in-charge.34 Such arrangements were found to facilitate more 
efficient and functional delegation of work among judges, because they 
were characterised by a degree of administrative autonomy and judicial 
specialisation.35 However, the internal divisional arrangements were 
insufficiently clear as they were not recorded in any court regulations or 
statute and therefore lacked the legal imprimatur of formal legal 
obligations. Furthermore, the judicial arrangements were designed for 
the executive system of governance, where judges primarily debated 
issues relevant to the legal procedure while court operations were being 
separately managed by the Department of Justice.  
 As a result of that legacy, there are today practically no provisions in 
the Victorian courts legislation that facilitate or clarify the functions and 
powers of the judges-in-charge of the internal divisions, either in 
relation to other judges, or in relation to the court administration as a 
whole. Neither the Chief Judges nor the divisional chief judges 
(‘Principal Judges’) in the County or the Supreme Courts have any 
formal legislative authority or management tools to administer their 
courts and divisions.36 It is also unclear what formal or informal 
arrangements are available to the CEOs in the higher courts to 
coordinate their activities with the councils of judges, executive 
committees or divisions. The overall perception is one of disunity and a 
lack of coordination between the formal and informal administrative 
structures in the courts.  
 The recent transfer of responsibility for court administration from 
the executive government to Court Services Victoria (CSV) has not 
materially resolved these issues, because one of the key features of the 
reform was to retain the existing provisions in the courts legislation, 
ostensibly to ensure that each jurisdiction would continue to be 
administered autonomously.37 In fact, the Court Services Victoria Act 
                                                 
in each of the Courts Acts that make the chief judicial officers responsible for 
directing the professional development and training of other judicial officers (S 28A 
of the Supreme Court Act 1986; s 13B of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989; s 17AAA of 
the County Court Act 1958). In the Court of Appeal, the President is responsible for 
ensuring the ‘orderly and expeditious exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of the 
Court of Appeal’: S 16 of the Supreme Court Act 1986. In addition, the chief judicial 
officers of the County and Supreme Courts have certain controlling competences in 
relation to the business of the Associate Judges and Judicial Registrars. See e.g. s 17E 
and 109A of the Supreme Court Act 1986; s 17ABA of the County Court Act 1958. 
34 See generally, R McGarvie, 'Judicial Responsibility for the Operation of the Court 
System' (1989) 63(2) Australian Law Journal 79. 
35 Ibid 91-2. 
36 Warren, above n 28, 36. 
37 Supreme Court of Victoria, Submission to the Productivity Commission, Access to 
Justice Arrangements (Supreme Court of Victoria, 2014) 12.  
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has arguably created additional uncertainty about the internal 
administrative arrangements in the courts, because the individual court 
CEOs are now also the subject to central directions by the CEO of CSV, 
as well as the Chief Judges of their courts.38  
 In an attempt to resolve these issues, the Victorian County and 
Supreme Courts have recently established an internal management 
board to be responsible for court administration, although little 
information is publicly available about these initiatives. The following 
Part seeks to contextualize the developments in Victoria by analyzing 
the corporate transformation of the courts in the USA, the UK and the 
Netherlands, in order to identify key principles of good corporate 
governance that ought to be taken into account in considering the 
structure and powers of an integrated court management board.  
II.CORPORATE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUDICIARY IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 The process of modern corporate transformation of the judiciary can 
be traced back to Roscoe Pound’s address to the annual convention of 
the American Bar Association in 1906.39 It is worth recalling that two of 
the four ‘causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of 
justice’ that were identified by Pound were closely associated with the 
problems of court administration; namely, ‘judicial organisation and 
procedure’ and the ‘environment of judicial administration.’40 The 
establishment of the Conference of Circuit Judges and the Circuit 
Councils in 1922 heralded the birth of the ‘American model’41 of court 
administration, which was characterised by full judicial control of court 
operations, with administrators reporting directly to judges rather than 
the executive government.42  
 From the Victorian perspective, one of the most remarkable features 
of the American model was the desire to formalise the administrative 
structures and relationships within the judiciary in the form of highly 
transparent rules and regulations.43 For example, as Wheeler pointed 
                                                 
38 Section 33 of the Court Services Victoria Act 2014 (Vic). For a detailed examination 
of the Court Services Victoria Act 2014 (Vic), see Tin Bunjevac, ‘Court Services 
Victoria and the New Politics of Judicial Independence: A Critical Analysis of the 
Court Services Victoria Act 2014 (Vic) (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 
(forthcoming). 
39 Roscoe Pound, 'The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice' (1906) 14 American Lawyer 445. 
40 Ibid 448-9. 
41 Perry S Miller and Carl Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada (Montreal, McGill, 
1981) 63. 
42 Baar et al,  above n 9, 61. In 1939 the Congress transferred the administrative 
control of the Federal Courts from the Department of Justice to the judiciary. 
43 See, generally, Russell R Wheeler, Origins of the Elements of Federal Court 
Governance (Federal Judicial Center, 1992). Examples of this practice can be found 
at all levels of the judicial organisation and across different states and federal Circuits. 
See, for example, National Center for State Courts, Key Elements of an Effective Rule 
of Court on the Role of the Presiding Judge in the Trial Courts (National Center for 
State Courts, 2006). See also the detailed Judicial Administration Rules of the 
Judicial Council of California at < 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=ten> For a critique of judicial 
A Judicial Board of Executive Directors 9 
 
out, the Circuit Councils had been given formal statutory powers to 
ensure the ‘expeditious and efficient’ disposition of cases and to issue 
administrative ‘orders’ that individual judges had to comply with.44 
Secondly, the American court reformers also recognised the importance 
of preserving individual courts’ operational autonomy, leaving basic 
decisions about case processing, staff selection and management in 
most cases to the courts themselves.45 This practice allowed individual 
jurisdictions and Circuits to develop innovative administrative rules 
and practices that were remarkably transparent and functional at the 
same time.46  
 Most importantly, for present purposes, there was recognition that 
certain management concepts drawn from the commercial world and 
the management theory could be readily adapted to the court 
environment. Over a period of several decades, the National Center for 
State Courts, the National Association for Court Management, the 
Federal Judicial Center and other bodies have developed an impressive 
array of policies and techniques that introduced some of the best 
practices from the commercial world to the unique organisational 
environment of the courts. Today this philosophy is reflected in a range 
of managerial approaches pioneered by the US courts that have entered 
the essential vocabulary of judges and court administrators throughout 
the world. It is no exaggeration to state that the concepts of weighted 
caseloads,47 case-flow management,48 total quality management49 and, 
more recently, judicial governance principles50 and organisational 
quality frameworks51 have truly revolutionized the ‘art and practice’ of 
court administration in many countries, including Australia.52 The 
Australian federal courts, for example, have successfully adopted the 
                                                 
corporatisation see Wolf V Heydebrand and Carroll Seron, Rationalizing Justice : 
The Political Economy of Federal District Courts (State University of New York 
Press, 1990) 14. 
44 Wheeler, above n 43, 18-19; Church and Sallmann,  above n 19, 73. 
45 Church and Sallmann, above n 19, 73. 
46 For example, s 6 of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 allowed courts of appeal 
with more than 15 judges to experiment with internal administrative units. The 
administrative innovations of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in particular, have 
been well-documented and studied around the world. See e.g. Church Jr, above n 31; 
See also McGarvie, above n 23: 30.  
47 V.E. Flango, B.J. Ostrom and National Center for State Courts, Assessing the Need 
for Judges and Court Support Staff (National Center for State Courts, 1996). 
48 D.C. Steelman et al, Caseflow Management: The Heart of Court Management in 
the New Millennium (National Center for State Courts, 2004). 
49 Alexander B Aikman, Tqm Total Quality Management in the Courts : A Handbook 
for Judicial Policy Makers and Administrators (National Center for State Courts, 
1994). 
50 National Center for State Courts, Principles for Judicial Administration (NCSC, 
2012); Christine Durham and Daniel Becker, Perspectives on State Court Leadership: 
A Case for Court Governance Principles (Harvard Kennedy School, 2010). 
51 National Center for State Courts, Courtools: Trial Court Performance Measures 
(National Center for State Courts, 2005). 
52 Alexander B Aikman, The Art and Practice of Court Administration (CRC Press, 
2007). 
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individual docket system53 and experimented with workload 
measurement systems for the judiciary,54 which were largely inspired by 
the concepts and practices developed by the American courts.55 
 Outside the USA, a similar evolutionary process has been underway 
in England, following the introduction of the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005 (UK), where it appears that the English judiciary is following 
firmly in the footsteps of twentieth century American court reformers. 
A landmark study by leading English constitutional academics recently 
concluded that the English judiciary’s ‘shift away from a culture of 
individualism towards one of corporatism’56 has significantly improved 
its accountability and enhanced its institutional capacity to protect 
judicial independence.57 According to Gee et al, the constitutional 
reforms necessitated the creation of more formal relationships both 
within the judiciary and between the judiciary and the other branches 
of government.58 This is reflected not only in the detailed procedures 
laid down in the Framework agreements that regulate the management 
of the courts, but also in the creation of a modern judicial bureaucracy, 
headed by the Judicial Executive Board, which now effectively operates 
as a ‘form of judicial Cabinet’.59 
 In other EU countries, arguably the most comprehensive court 
system reforms have been introduced in the Netherlands, where the 
‘executive’ system of court administration has been replaced by modern 
corporate board structures inside the courts themselves. A court 
management board now fully integrates the judicial and administrative 
functions of court administration under a single executive court 
authority, thus replacing two separate management systems that were 
previously in place in the courts.60 According to Voermans and Albers, 
the system of integrated management, which is modelled on a small 
corporate board of executive directors, facilitates effective collegiate 
decision-making on the board, while also introducing a more 
hierarchical management style in the internal court divisions, focusing 
on the management aspects of the work of divisional chief judges.61  
                                                 
53 Caroline Sage et al, Case Management Reform: A Study of the Federal Court's 
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Judicial Council Conference Inside the Administration of Justice: Toward a New 
Model of Court Administration, Victoria, British Columbia, 31 January 2007). Justice 
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docket system. 
56 Gee et al, above n 3, 126. 
57 Ibid 101 and 112. See generally also Kate Malleson, The New Judiciary: The Effects 
of Expansion and Activism (Ashgate, 1999). 
58 Gee et al, above n 3, 252-3. 
59 Ibid 253-4. See also Ch 6. 
60 Tin Bunjevac, 'Court Governance: The Challenge of Change' (2011) 20 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 201, 221. 
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 These developments suggest that the process of modern 
institutional transformation of the judiciary is evolving from mere 
adaptation of good management practices imposed upon existing court 
structures, towards the establishment of new policy-making and 
management frameworks in the courts that are also modelled on their 
modern corporate equivalents. As Voermans and Albers point out, new 
governance arrangements are required in order to give the courts more 
internal possibilities to improve their operations.62 This is because the 
operational and interpersonal divide between the judicial and non-
judicial officers in the traditional model had substantially reduced the 
possibilities for greater workflow integration and the creation of deeper 
patterns of work delegation between judges and professional court 
staff.63 In their view, these problems can best be resolved by the 
introduction of a central management board, in which the 
administrative judges, acting as the ‘executives of courts,’ would be 
given greater ‘responsibility and powers in financial and personnel 
matters.’64 
The following Part explores these issues in more detail, by seeking 
to reconcile the corporate law theory of board design with the unique 
institutional characteristics of the courts. It is argued that a small board 
of management, modelled on a corporate board of executive directors, 
should be responsible for the judicial and administrative operations of 
the courts, with judges acting on the board as executive directors 
together with the court CEO. It is contended that such an arrangement 
would be capable of safeguarding the unique institutional character of 
the courts, while also achieving greater structural separation between 
‘ownership’ and ‘management’ of the organisation, which is regarded as 
an essential postulate of modern corporate law. 
III.CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY AND THE COURTS 
 The modern corporate law principles of board design have 
occasionally influenced the thinking of court reformers in the USA, 
Australia and other countries. As early as the 1970s, Friesen et al 
proposed a small board of judges that would sit as a policy board and 
function as an ‘intervening element between the judicial environment 
and the court organisation.’65 In their view, the policy-making function 
of the Board was to provide a ‘structural pattern for judicial 
administration concurrently with high quality court management.’66 In 
Australia, a similar view was espoused by Hill, who analysed the internal 
governance structures in the Victorian courts and concluded that the 
division of administrative responsibilities inside the courts was 
                                                 
62 Voermans and Albers, 'Councils for the Judiciary in Eu Countries', above n 9, 101. 
63 See Voermans and Albers, ‘Geintegreerde Rechtbanken’, above n 11, 70–7, 90–2. 
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insufficiently clear and that the ‘opportunity for judges to exercise 
meaningful control over court administration [w]as also slight.’67 Hill’s 
principal contention was that the courts should draw upon the 
corporate governance business model, ‘one which separates 
management from equity holders and from final policy 
determination.’68 According to this view, the judges sitting on the 
councils of judges can only be characterised as ‘equity holders,’ because 
they are not in an effective position to act as a true policy-making organ, 
such as a board of directors in a corporation.69 This characterisation is 
significant, because it supports the proposition that the large collegiate 
assemblies of judges should not have a direct role in the management of 
the courts, because they tend to promote weak and inefficient decision-
making that is primarily aimed a reaching a consensus among judges on 
all aspects of their work in the courts.70  
 Hill’s thesis was strongly influenced by established corporate 
governance principles, which require greater structural separation of 
the function of the board of directors from that of the shareholders’ 
meeting in a corporation. This corporate law device is designed 
primarily to facilitate ‘more expert and efficient management of the 
corporation,’ 71 although it also serves to attract capital and allow 
shareholders to exercise indirect control over corporate management 
through the supervisory function of the board. In practical terms, this 
means that the dispersed corporate shareholders have very limited 
input in the board’s policy deliberations, apart from being entitled to 
participate and vote in annual general meetings and to take a ‘positive 
interest’ in the composition and performance of the board.72 Most 
importantly, the corporate board is considered to be an independent 
organ of the company, rather than merely being an agent of the 
shareholders’ meeting.73  
In operational terms, the board is mainly concerned with the 
strategic policy, while corporate managers have the authority to deal 
with matters of operational performance of the company.i The policy 
rationale behind these principles is to avoid a situation where the Board 
is tempted to step into the operational side of the company’s business, 
while also preventing the company management or the CEO from 
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usurping the policy-making function that properly rests with the board 
elected by the shareholders.74 
A.The Agency theory of corporate governance and the courts 
 Although the corporate board model is generally regarded as being 
effective in facilitating more expert and efficient management of the 
corporation, until more recently the corporate governance theory could 
not properly reconcile the underlying organisational dynamics of 
commercial enterprises with the unique internal demands and 
characteristics of certain types of organisations, such as the courts. 
Namely, the corporate law has predominantly viewed the interests and 
stakeholder relationships within organisations through the prism of the 
so-called ‘agency theory’ of corporate governance. According to this 
theory, corporate governance seeks to resolve an inherent conflict of 
interests between the corporate owners, the board and management, 
with the view to achieving profit maximisation through commercial 
activity.75 As Kraakman and Hansmann point out, the problem lies in 
ensuring that the board and management (‘agents’) remain responsive 
to the owners’ interests (‘principals’), rather than their own personal 
interests.76 The agency theory seeks to resolve these conflicts by 
introducing a range of constraining devices, such as executive 
compensation schemes, regulatory requirements and internal board 
structures, which are specifically designed to better align the inherently 
conflicting interests of the agents and the principals.77 In theory, that 
task is best achieved by fully separating the functions of the board and 
management, and by having a majority of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, in order to reduce the management’s potential 
influence on the board of directors.78  
 Admittedly, it is almost impossible to apply the agency theory’s 
organisational prescriptions to the unique internal characteristics of the 
judicial organisation. The administration of justice in the courts is 
quintessentially a non-commercial undertaking, because the judicial 
organisation is centred around the utilitarian and altruistic goals of 
fairness, impartiality, justice and equality before the law. As Hill points 
out, a judge’s interest in the internal affairs of the court is much more 
immediate, long-term and personal than the shareholders’ interest in 
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the internal affairs of the company.79 Secondly, shareholders typically 
do not participate in company management, whereas judges’ input in 
court operations is both essential and direct. Thirdly, shareholders are 
usually not employed by their company, whereas judges act as policy-
makers, administrators, as well as ‘employees’ of the courts - in the 
sense that they are ultimately responsible for the primary process of the 
organisation. As a result, it can be said that judges, as ‘tenured 
shareholders,’ have a much more tangible interest in the management 
of their courts than do ordinary shareholders in the management of 
their company. Moreover, the interests of the judicial ‘principals’ and 
management appear to be fundamentally aligned, because there is no 
inherent conflict of interest between the principals and agents, which is 
a defining characteristic of most commercial enterprises. 
B.The Stewardship theory of corporate governance and the courts 
 Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a complementary theory of 
corporate governance with roots in psychology and sociology has been 
developed in order to explain the situations where the organisational 
interests of the principals and agents appear to be more aligned. The so-
called ‘Stewardship theory’ of corporate governance takes a decidedly 
positive view of the personal attributes of, and interactions between, the 
shareholders, the board members and management in specific 
organisational environments. According to a seminal paper by Davis 
and Donaldson, the organisational actors in the stewardship model feel 
personally motivated to act as the corporate stewards, by seeking to 
achieve non-financial, ‘intrinsic satisfaction’ and by acting responsibly 
and in line with the broader organisational objectives of the entity.80 In 
a follow-up study Davies at al specifically identified loosely coupled, 
heterogeneous organisations (such as the courts81), as ones where the 
corporate stewards were likely to be ‘motivated to make decisions that 
are in the best interests of the group.’82 The authors drew upon a wealth 
of organisational literature to identify the typical profile of a corporate 
steward as someone who self-identifies with the organisation and is 
motivated by non-financial, ‘higher order’ needs.83 Unlike the corporate 
agent, who favours ‘control-oriented mechanisms’ and ‘high-power 
distance culture’, the steward has a strong preference for organisational 
structures and mechanisms that are ‘involvement-oriented,’ ‘trust-
based’ and foster ‘value-commitment.’84  
 Based on the above, it is reasonable to hypothesise that judges in 
charge of the court operations can be characterised as the judicial 
‘stewards’ under the stewardship theory of corporate governance. This 
is because the courts’ internal organisational dynamics are very much 
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centred upon the intrinsic values of justice and the rule of law, while the 
stewards’ personal motivations are not profit-related, but rather are 
informed by strong value-commitments, trust-based relationships and 
peer-respect. Above all, the intrinsic motivations of the judicial 
stewards appear to be fundamentally aligned with those of the judicial 
principals sitting on the councils of judges.  
Importantly, the stewardship theory also has a number of practical 
prescriptions in areas such as the board design, which stem from its 
more positive interpretation of the organisational separation between 
ownership and control. According to Maassen, stewardship theorists 
ostensibly agree with the agency-theory notion that the separation 
between ownership and control is an effective and efficient means of 
managing large organisations.85 However, unlike the agency theory, 
which sees goal-conflict as an inevitable consequence of the diverging 
interests of the corporate owners and corporate managers, the 
stewardship theory’s preference for goal-alignment holds that the 
principals can expect much better results where the internal 
organisational structure facilitates greater control by those in charge of 
the management.86 Therefore, the stewardship theory has a strong 
preference for an internal governance architecture that better integrates 
policy-making and management, such as a small board of executive 
directors, 87 because the corporate stewards will thereby be more likely 
to be empowered to influence the strategic direction of the 
corporation.88 
IV.BOARD OF EXECUTIVE JUDGES IN THE COURTS 
 As the analysis of the Australian models of court governance in Part 
1 demonstrates, the policy debate about the internal governance 
architecture of the courts is not purely academic in nature, but rather 
involves issues of great practical significance for the courts in most 
Australian jurisdictions. We have seen that in the federal courts there 
was no effective separation between ownership, management and 
control, because the policy-making and management functions are 
formally vested in the Chief Justices alone (although, in practice, their 
policy-making function tends to be exercised in a more collegiate 
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manner).89 The opposite problem was identified in the Victorian courts, 
where the large councils of judges were unable to effectively perform the 
policy-making function of a board of directors, while the court 
management function was awkwardly divided between the councils and 
their judicial committees, court divisions and the rest of the court 
administration headed by the court CEO. Arguably, therefore, this 
organisational architecture also suffers from a lack of clarity regarding 
the internal division of responsibilities between the existing 
administrative structures and officers-in-charge.90 
The analysis of the stewardship theory suggests that a small board 
of executive judges could potentially resolve some of these problems, 
because it would integrate the management and policy-making 
functions in the one administrative organ, while also ensuring more 
effective collegiate decision-making on behalf of the court as a whole. 
This following discussion seeks to anchor the theoretical model in 
practice, by analysing the emerging contours of the proposed judicial 
board model in the courts of the USA, Australia and the Netherlands. 
A.Early precursors: Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal and Queensland 
Courts 
 According to Church, one of the pioneers in this area was the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal under the leadership of Chief Judge Browning. 
One of the court’s early innovations was the appointment and inclusion 
of ‘administrative chief judges’ on the court’s executive committee, 
which assumed a central role in managing the court’s business once its 
size had grown from 13 to almost 30 judges.91 Notably, from 1981, the 
committee was authorised by the judges to make autonomous decisions 
on all matters that were deemed by the committee itself to be of 
insufficient importance to require action by all of the judges.92 Thus it 
can be said that the executive committee of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeal was an early precursor to a board of executive directors, because 
it effectively removed the policy-making and management aspects of the 
court’s business from the council of judges in practically all cases. At the 
same time, the inclusion of the administrative chief judges 
demonstrated a desire to achieve more functional division of 
responsibilities on the committee itself, based on the judges’ operational 
responsibilities (rather than their seniority, regional representation or 
policy-making expertise alone), which corresponds with the operational 
foci of boards of executive directors. In other words, the executive 
committee effectively integrated its policy making function with 
operational management to the extent that the Chief Judge and the 
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Administrative Chief Judges were also actively involved in the 
operational aspects of court administration.93 
 In Australia, Queensland was the first jurisdiction to have formally 
vested sweeping administrative powers in the administrative judges. 
The District Court and Supreme Court legislation gives the 
administrative judges the powers to do ‘all things necessary or 
convenient to be done’ for the administration of the courts and makes 
them responsible to the Chief Judges for ensuring the ‘orderly and 
expeditious exercise of the jurisdiction’ of those courts.94 These powers 
were inserted in the legislation more recently in order to clarify that the 
administrative judge is ‘senior to all other judges of the court apart from 
the Chief Judge.’95  
 The Queensland example is significant because the legislation 
clearly separates the judges’ administrative position from their judicial 
office and therefore creates a dedicated judicial executive function solely 
responsible for court administration. Indeed, according to the 
Parliamentary debates leading to the appointment of the administrative 
judges, the intended role for these judicial officers was to ensure that 
‘modern case flow management techniques and other needed reforms 
could be put into place to improve the efficiency and responsiveness’ of 
the court.96  
The Queensland model is also significant in that it keeps the 
responsibility for court administration away from the councils of judges. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the functions conferred on the 
Chief Judges and administrative judges in Queensland are confined to 
matters of judicial administration, because court operations in that 
jurisdiction are separately managed by the executive arm of 
government. Therefore, although the functions and powers of the 
administrative judges in Queensland appear to closely resemble a 
corporate board of judicial executives, in reality their contribution to 
wider court administration policy and strategic planning of court 
operations remains limited. Nevertheless, the Queensland legislation 
represents a good example of a judicial management framework where 
the administrative duties, functions and powers of the judicial 
executives are transparent, functional and well-defined. 
B.The Court Management Board in the Netherlands 
 In the EU countries, as foreshadowed, the most significant example 
of the corporate board design has been introduced in the Netherlands, 
where the internal governance architecture of the courts is centred 
around their internal legal-administrative divisions (‘sectors’), such as 
                                                 
93 Ibid 245. However, Church also notes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal 
Executive Committee included non-executive judges who served as representatives 
from the geographical regions and circuits. 
94 S. 51 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) and s 28F of the District 
Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). 
95 Justice and Other Information Disclosure Bill 2008 (Qld), Explanatory 
Memorandum, 11-12. 
96 See Queensland Legislative Assembly 10 October 1991, Parliamentary debates, 1713.  
A Judicial Board of Executive Directors 18 
 
the administrative, criminal and civil law divisions that are also 
commonly found in most Australian state courts. In 2002, the Dutch 
legislation established an executive board for each court other than the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands. According to the Judiciary 
(Organisation) Act, all judges and administrative officers are formally 
subordinated to the decisions of the executive board.97 In order to 
ensure individual judicial independence, the governing board is not 
permitted to interfere in any procedural aspects, substantive 
assessment or the decision in a specific case or category of cases.98   
 One of the striking features of the Dutch model of court governance 
is that it fully separates the court management from the judicial ‘equity 
holders,’ something that even the early American court reformers had 
never sought to accomplish. As a result, the councils of judges in the 
Netherlands no longer have a formal say in the court operations, 
although they continue to perform an advisory role to the governing 
board.99 The composition of the governing board itself has been 
faithfully modelled upon a corporate board of executive directors. 
Under the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, the governing board consists 
of a chairperson (the court president), up to four divisional chief judges, 
and one non-judicial member who is the CEO.100 The governing board 
is under a legal obligation to establish within the court up to four 
organisational divisions,101 with each division having its own judicial, 
administrative and even financial responsibilities.102 A further notable 
feature of the Dutch governing board is that all of the divisional chief 
judges, including the court president, are appointed by Royal Decree for 
a 6-year term.103 The idea behind this requirement is that the judicial 
representatives on the board should be chosen based on their 
administrative competence, rather than their seniority or position in the 
judicial hierarchy, which has been identified in the literature as one of 
the key principles of good judicial governance.104  
 The management of each court division is allocated to a divisional 
team, which consists of the divisional chief judge and a professional 
court administrator. The divisional judge chairs the divisional meetings 
and is responsible for the day-to-day management of the division, while 
the coordinator manages the administrative staff in consultation with 
the divisional judge.105 This arrangement seeks to ensure that each 
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division is managed more independently and efficiently, by integrating 
the judicial and administrative powers in the court divisions, without 
the need to refer day-to-day operational matters to the board itself.106 
The divisional planning is coordinated between the management board 
and the divisions based on a quarterly cycle.  
 Because the divisional judges are also members of the governing 
board of the court, the framework provides balance and collegiality at 
the policy-making level. At the same time, the policy-making function 
and management have been integrated, by allowing the divisional 
judges to actively participate in policy formulation at the board level. 
Overall, however, the policy-making function rests solely with the 
management board, while the responsibility for operational 
management has been delegated to the organisational units that are 
most familiar with the judicial work in the divisions themselves.  
 Significantly, the Dutch legislation also takes into account the 
general principles of internal administrative transparency that were 
identified in Part 2. For example, the Act prescribes the governing 
board’s duties and responsibilities in some detail, while also imposing 
on the board further administrative requirements that must be 
addressed in internal court ‘regulations’.107 Thus according to s 23 of the 
Judiciary (Organisation) Act, the board is responsible for the 
budgeting, planning and control cycle, as well as the overall functioning 
of the courts, including personnel matters, organisational procedures 
and information and management systems.108 Furthermore, the 
governing board is required to create transparent court regulations that 
govern its procedure, decision-making, division of responsibilities, 
organisational structure, complaints procedure, delegation, 
replacement of members in the event of illness and the jurisdictional 
allocation of cases between the divisions.109  
 Based on the discussion above, it appears that the Dutch board 
model meets the key requirements of modern corporate board design 
that have been identified in this paper. One of the unique achievements 
of the Dutch model is that it fully separates the court management from 
the judicial ‘principals’, which is regarded in corporate governance 
theory as the key to achieving more effective and efficient management 
of large organisations. Similarly, the establishment of the divisional 
teams, which are centred upon the courts’ existing legal-administrative 
divisions, serves to promote better integration of the operational and 
policy-making functions at the board, by fostering greater involvement 
of the divisional chief judges in the divisional administration and policy-
making at the board. An independent review of the Dutch courts 
concluded that the divisional arrangements, in particular, had been 
effectively implemented in that they provided a ‘solution to the 
aforementioned lack of clarity regarding the division of tasks, powers 
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and responsibilities’ which had previously impeded court 
administration in the executive model.110 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper has sought to identify a number of principles of good 
corporate governance that would be useful in considering the structure 
and powers of the proposed court management board. The experiences 
from the USA and Europe demonstrate that the process of modern 
corporate transformation of the courts is evolving from mere adaptation 
of corporate management practices imposed upon existing court 
structures, towards the establishment of modern court governance 
frameworks that are modelled on their corporate world equivalents. 
 The article proposes the establishment of a small board of executive 
judges, which would structurally separate the court management from 
the councils of judges.  That organisational framework would offer an 
effective answer to the problems of misalignment of the administrative 
responsibilities in many Australian courts. It would also provide a 
functional collegiate forum for policy-making, thus addressing the 
problems associated with the Chief Justices’ administrative dominance 
in the Australian federal courts.  
 The proposed model is theoretically underpinned by the 
‘stewardship’ theory of corporate governance, which sees benefits in 
integrating the policy-making and operational functions in a small 
board of executive directors, in situations where the interests of the 
board members (judicial ‘stewards’) appear to be fundamentally aligned 
with those of the principals (councils of judges). 
The experiences from other jurisdictions show that the vesting of 
formal legislative powers in the chief and administrative judges is the 
key to resolving any problems of administrative ambiguity. The courts 
legislation in the Netherlands, in particular, provides an excellent 
example of a transparent normative framework with clearly identified 
structures, duties and responsibilities of the management board and the 
divisional teams. This should be contrasted with the existing legislation 
in Victoria, which is deficient in that it does not facilitate or clarify the 
functions and powers of the internal administrative structures either in 
relation to individual judges, or in relation to the court administration 
as a whole. 
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